Accords régionaux: une approche en termes de jeux coopératifs

Daniel Laskar () and Claude Jessua

Revue Économique, 1996, vol. 47, issue 3, 797-806

Abstract: [eng] Using a general three-country model which encompasses some existing models in the literature on regional agreements, dealing with monetary, fiscal or commercial policy, this paper determines the conditions under which regional agreements appear as solutions. The solution concept which is used corresponds to the core in cooperative game theory.. It is underlined that the free-riding argument leads to results which depend on the negotiation context, while in the absence of a free rider problem the results are very sensitive to the existence of transfers or of differences between countries. [fre] À partir d'un modèle général à trois pays qui englobe un certain nombre de modèles existants dans la littérature sur la formation d'accords régionaux, portant sur la politique monétaire, budgétaire ou commerciale, on détermine les condi­tions qui font apparaître ces accords comme solutions. Le concept de solution retenu correspond au cœur en théorie des jeux coopératifs.. On souligne en particulier que l'argument en termes de free rider conduit à des résultats qui dépendent du contexte de la négociation, alors qu'en l'absence de problème de free rider les résultats s'avèrent sensibles à l'existence de trans­ferts ou de différences entre pays.

Date: 1996
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409818
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