Marchés incomplets et intermédiation financière

Emmanuelle Gabillon ()

Revue Économique, 1997, vol. 48, issue 4, 805-833

Abstract: [eng] In an environment of complete financial markets, we show how firmes from the real sector have incentive to make markets incomplete by pooling their financing. Indeed, without intermediation, each firms goes to the market to raise cash by selling an individual claim. When financial intermediation occurs, an intermediary (that can be considered as a coalition of firms) issues one claim to raise ressourses for all the firms belonging to the coalition. Therefore, its formation reduces the number of assets that can be used by consumers for insurance motives. Because they are less insured, consumers try to save more and increase their demand for available assets. Consequently, equilibrium prices go up and financial intermediaries benefit from cheaper ressources. They are able to propose costless loans to firms. However, we will see that, at equilibrium, the coexistence of direct and inter­mediated lending is possible. Indeed, the choice between direct and indirect finance depends on the firm's characteristics. [fre] Incomplete markets and financial intermediation. . In an environment of complete financial markets, we show how firmes from the real sector have incentive to make markets incomplete by pooling their financing. Indeed, without intermediation, each firms goes to the market to raise cash by selling an individual claim. When financial intermediation occurs, an intermediary (that can be considered as a coalition of firms) issues one claim to raise ressourses for all the firms belonging to the coalition. Therefore, its formation reduces the number of assets that can be used by consumers for insurance motives. Because they are less insured, consumers try to save more and increase their demand for available assets. Consequently, equilibrium prices go up and financial intermediaries benefit from cheaper ressources. They are able to propose costless loans to firms. However, we will see that, at equilibrium, the coexistence of direct and inter­mediated lending is possible. Indeed, the choice between direct and indirect finance depends on the firm's characteristics.

Date: 1997
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1997.409917
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