Indépendance de la Banque centrale et politique monétaire: application à la Banque centrale euopéenne

Annabelle Mourougane

Revue Française d'Économie, 1998, vol. 13, issue 1, 135-197

Abstract: [eng] This paper sums up the main results developed by the literature about indépendance and credibility of the monetary policy and uses them to analyse the European Central Bank status. According to the Maastricht treaty, the ECB's main objective should be price stability and ECB should be indépendant from political pressures. This can be related to Rogoff 's theory of a conservative governor, which shows that a delegation to an indépendant monetary autority can both reduce the inflationary bias induced by a lack of credibility, and limit fluctuations on the labour market after a supply shock. [fre] Rogoff. Cette délégation de pouvoir monétaire à un gouverneur indépendant permettrait de baisser le biais inflationniste, issu d'un manque initial de crédibilité, tout en conservant la possibilité de limiter les fluctuations consécutives à des chocs d'offre sur le marché du travail.

Date: 1998
Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1998.1043
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