The role of formal and informal actors in village fund utilization: An IAD-Informed MACTOR analysis of power relations in Aan Village, Bali, Indonesia

Anak Agung Istri Ngurah Marhaeni, Surya Dewi Rustariyuni and Dewa Jati Primajana ()
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Anak Agung Istri Ngurah Marhaeni: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Udayana, Bali, Indonesia
Surya Dewi Rustariyuni: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Udayana, Bali, Indonesia
Dewa Jati Primajana: Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Udayana, Bali, Indonesia

Journal of Economics and Business Letters, 2026, vol. 6, issue 6, 1-26

Abstract: Indonesia’s Village Fund provides villages with substantial resources and planning discretion; however, little is known about how formal and informal actors jointly shape its use. This study examines the influence, positions, and potential alliances among actors in Village Fund utilization in Aan Village, Bali, where an administrative village coexists with customary villages. Building on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework and stakeholder theory, this study operationalizes the village budgeting action situation through the Matrix of Alliances and Conflicts: Tactics, Objectives, and Recommendations (MACTOR) method. Influence and position matrices were elicited from 11 informants representing seven actor categories through interviews and focus group discussions and tested using a Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis. The village head, Village Consultative Body, and village secretary formed a formal core whose mean competitiveness exceeded that of informal leaders in at least 98 percent of perturbed scenarios, although the ranking within this core was not robust. All actors supported all six objectives, and mobilization concentrated on cash-for-work, direct cash assistance, and COVID-19 response, consistent with centrally mandated earmarks. The Village Consultative Body held the largest power-weighted stake and priorities closer to those of informal leaders than of the village head, yet its perceived leverage over the village head was limited. Village-owned enterprises revealed a latent intensity gap between the village head and both customary leaders and community members. Formal authority appears to convert into allocative control, whereas customary legitimacy operates mainly through endorsement. Strengthening the Village Consultative Body’s leverage and institutionalizing coordination with customary villages are recommended.

Keywords: village governance; customary institutions; stakeholder analysis; elite capture; institutional rules; Dana Desa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.55942/jebl.v6i6.2239

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