The Case for Central Bank Independence
Jakob de Haan () and
Jan-Egbert Sturm ()
BNL Quarterly Review, 1992, vol. 45, issue 182, 305-327
This paper reviews arguments for central bank independence and presents new evidence on the impact of central bank (in)dependence on the level and variability of inflation, money growth, the level and financing of government budget deficits and economic growth, using three different measures of central bank independence. There are indications that countries with an independent central bank experience a lower and more stable inflation rate than countries with a central bank which comes under direct political control. Moreover, central bank credit to government and government budget deficits are lower, while economic growth is not directly affected by central bank independence.
Keywords: Money; central bank independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 F36 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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