Towards a sovereign bankruptcy procedure and greater restraint in IMF crisis lending. An interim assessmen

Curzio Giannini ()
Additional contact information
Curzio Giannini: Banca d'Italia, Ufficio Relazioni Internazionali, Roma (Italy)

BNL Quarterly Review, 2003, vol. 56, issue 225, 83-112

Abstract: The paper reviews the area of the international financial architecture relating tosovereign crisis resolution. It is argued that shifting part of the burden of crisisresolution onto creditors may encourage debtor countries to take early action to counter an unsustainable debt path. Collective action clauses, the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and ceilings on IMF loans, are all necessary components of a new and better crisis resolution framework.

Keywords: Debt; IMF; Lending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F32 F33 F34 O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/9894/9776 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:2003:21

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.economiacivile.it

Access Statistics for this article

BNL Quarterly Review is currently edited by Alessandro Roncaglia

More articles in BNL Quarterly Review from Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carlo D'Ippoliti ().