The generation and distribution of central bank seigniorage in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
Eduard Hochreiter and
Riccardo Rovelli
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 2002, vol. 55, issue 223, 391-415
Abstract:
We measure the amount of central bank seigniorage generated in three economies in transition and inquire to what extent seigniorage ultimately accrues to the government. We relate our findings to the institutional environment of the three countries. We find that, in parallel to the process of disinflation, seigniorage has declined substantially in the 1990s in all three countries under consideration pointing to more monetary discipline and a strengthening of central bank independence. Only in Hungary seigniorage benefited the government to a significant amount. We interpret this as being the consequence of past policies, rather than an obstacle to further disinflation.
Keywords: Disinflation; Monetary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E52 E58 P21 P24 P34 P35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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