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The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters

Jens Abildtrup and Franck Jensen
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Franck Jensen: University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics, DK-1958

Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, 2014, vol. 95, issue 3, 281-298

Abstract: This paper examines a tax/subsidy on hunters based on game population. The tax/subsidy is the difference between actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference between the marginal value of the game population to the hunter and the regulator and differences in user costs of the population. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum.

Keywords: Hunting; population tax; regulation; forest; externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 Q23 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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