The Homo Oeconomicus Paradigm and the Design of Public Policies. Some Underrated Issues

Elena Granaglia

QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, 2009, issue 1

Abstract: Endorsing Pennacchi’s exhortation in La moralità del welfare (Donzelli, Roma, 2008) to abandon the homo oeconomicus paradigm and recognise a more complex preference structure, as well as the endogenous character of preferences themselves, this article dwells on some underrated shortcomings that the homo oeconomicus paradigm may produce in the design of public policies. Attention focuses on the risks of violating non-self-interested and non-materialistic preferences; of creating perverse effects with respect to the overall goals of policies while failing to exploit the potential of the policies themselves.

Keywords: Welfare Economics; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents, Homo Oeconomicus Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rar:journl:0097

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