CEO Power and Auditor Choice

Zenghui Liu, Bo Ouyang and Xiaojie (Christine) Sun
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Zenghui Liu: Department of Accounting, Western Washington University, USA
Bo Ouyang: Management Division, Pennsylvania State University Great Valley, USA
Xiaojie (Christine) Sun: Department of Accounting, California State University San Marcos, USA

International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, 2015, vol. 4, issue 4, 44-51

Abstract: In this paper, we examine the impact of CEO power on auditor choice. We are motivated by the competing financial reporting incentives arising from CEO power. Our empirical finding suggests thatpowerful CEOs are more likely to hire high-quality auditors as a signal of superior financial reporting quality. We contribute to the literature of auditor switch and extend the research on the links between CEO power and firm behaviors.

Keywords: CEO Power; Auditor Choice; Agency Problem; Corporate Governance; Audit Quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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