Tax collection, the informal sector, and productivity

Julio Leal Ordóñez

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2014, vol. 17, issue 2, 262-286

Abstract: An important determinant of informality in a country is its tax enforcement capacity, which some authors argue further distorts the decisions of firms and creates inefficiency. In this paper, I assess the quantitative effect of incomplete tax enforcement on aggregate output and productivity using a dynamic general equilibrium framework. I calibrate the model using data for Mexico, where the informal sector is large. I then investigate the effects of improving enforcement. I find that under complete enforcement, Mexico's labor productivity and output would be 19% higher under perfect competition and 34% higher under monopolistic competition. The source of this gain is the removal of the distortions induced by incomplete enforcement of taxes. These distortions affect the economy in three ways: by reducing the capital-labor ratios of informal establishments; by allowing low-productive entrepreneurs to enter; and by misallocating resources towards low-productive establishments. As a result, TFP and capital accumulation are reduced, and hence output. I decompose the gains following the guidelines of five leading papers in the literature of resource misallocation across plants. I isolate the effects of pure factor misallocation, distorted occupational choices, capital accumulation, and complementarities. I also study marginal improvements in enforcement and find that there is an inverted-U relationship between the size of the informal sector and output. This reflects the fact that improving enforcement entails a tradeoff: more taxes vs. fewer distortions. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Tax enforcement; TFP; Misallocation; The informal sector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E23 E26 O17 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2013.07.004

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