Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy
Gaetano Antinolfi (),
Francesca Carapella (),
Charles Kahn (),
Antoine Martin (),
David Mills () and
Ed Nosal ()
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 1, 21-31
This paper studies the optimal bankruptcy policy for repurchase agreements (repos) with respect to their exemption from the automatic stay of bankruptcy. The exemption from automatic stay has been one of the key contributors to the development of the repo market as a major source of funding for many financial market participants. At the same time the exemption has raised concerns that the default of a large institution could cause externalities on other markets, in the form of fire-sales. We find that exempting repos from the automatic stay may increase the size of the repo market by enhancing the liquidity of collateral, but it can cause fire sales that are associated with reductions in real investment. Hence, policy makers face a trade-off between the benefits of investment activity and the benefits of liquid repo markets. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: Repos; Fire sales; Bankruptcy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G18 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy (2012)
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