Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010
Juergen Jung and
Chung Tran
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2016, vol. 20, 132-159
Abstract:
We quantify the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) using a stochastic general equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous health capital accumulation calibrated to match U.S. data on health spending and insurance take-up over the lifecycle. We find that the introduction of an insurance mandate and the expansion of Medicaid which are at the core of the ACA increase the insurance take-up rate of workers to almost universal coverage but decrease capital accumulation, labor supply and aggregate output. Penalties for not having insurance as well as subsidies to assist low income individuals' purchase of insurance via health insurance market places do reduce the adverse selection problem in private health insurance markets and do counteract the crowding-out effect of the Medicaid expansion. The redistributional measures embedded in the ACA result in welfare gains for low income individuals in poor health and welfare losses for high income individuals in good health. The overall welfare effect depends on the size of the ex-post moral hazard effect, tax distortions and general equilibrium price adjustments. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: Affordable Care Act 2010; insurance mandate; Medicaid; Grossman health capital; lifecycle health spending and financing; dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E21 E62 H51 I18 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)
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Working Paper: Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010 (2016) 
Working Paper: Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010 (2011) 
Working Paper: Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010 (2011) 
Working Paper: Market Inefficiency, Insurance Mandate and Welfare: U.S. Health Care Reform 2010 (2010) 
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DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2016.02.002
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