A Signaling Model of Multiple Currencies

Narayana Kocherlakota and Thomas Krueger
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Thomas Krueger: International Monetary Fund

Review of Economic Dynamics, 1999, vol. 2, issue 1, 231-244

Abstract: In this paper, we demonstrate that it may be socially optimal for countries to have different currencies, even though they have no possibility of independently controlling their money supplies. We assume that agents have heterogeneous preferences over goods of different national origin, and that these preferences are private information. We prove three results. First, for a range of parameters, it is optimal for different countries to have different currencies so that buyers can more efficiently signal their preferences over goods to sellers. Second, if it is socially optimal to have different national currencies, then it is socially optimal for sellers to sell lower quantities to buyers bearing foreign currency. Finally, it is only necessary to have two monies if cross-country trade is optimal. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: signaling; currency unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0038

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