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Adaptive Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games

Mario Gilli ()

Review of Economic Dynamics, 1999, vol. 2, issue 2, 472-485

Abstract: This paper deals with the problem of specifying a general learning model, the rationality of which is not situation dependent. I propose a very general model of adaptive learning suitable to study learning problems in games with imperfect monitoring, such as extensive form games. In this context I relate adaptive learning with a general notion of equilibrium; in particular I provide a dynamic characterization of Conjectural equilibria: a "stable" strategy profile is consistent with adaptive learning if and only if it is a Conjectural equilibrium. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: adaptive learning; justification operator; imperfect monitoring games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0047

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