Folk Theorem with One-sided Information

Harrison Cheng
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Harrison Cheng: University of Southern California

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2000, vol. 3, issue 2, 338-363

Abstract: A game with one-sided moral hazard is represented by a two-stage games. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the folk theorem to hold. Equilibrium payoffs are generated by payoffs from pure strategy profiles which do not admit profitable nondetectable deviations. The enforceable maximum payoff is shown to be a better notion for the individually rational payoff. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1006/redy.1999.0079

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