Relative Performance Evaluations in a Model of Financial Intermediation
Satoshi Kawanishi ()
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2000, vol. 3, issue 4, 801-830
Abstract:
This paper focuses on the delegation of bank managers of lending decisions to their agents typically subordinate employees of the bank. We assume that agents may base their decisions about lending to borrowers on decisions other banks have made about these same borrowers. Then we show that there exist some lazy or negligent agents who neither directly monitor the borrower nor imitate the other banks if managers use relative performance evaluations as incentive schemes. In addition, it is shown that the learning or adjustment process of agents exhibits cyclical dynamics. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: relative performance evaluation; imitation; negligence; random matching game; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:4:p:801-830
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DOI: 10.1006/redy.1999.0091
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