An Anti-folk Theorem in Overlapping Generations Games with Limited Observability

Kiho Yoon

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2001, vol. 4, issue 3, 736-745

Abstract: We study the effect of limited observability on the possibility of cooperation in a simple overlapping generations model. If new entrants can observe only the recent history of the game, then cooperation cannot be sustained for certain classes of games. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: anti-folk theorem; limited observability; overlapping generations games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1006/redy.2000.0127

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