Unemployment Insurance and the Role of Self-Insurance
Atila Abdulkadiroglu,
Burhanettin Kuruscu and
Aysegul Sahin
Additional contact information
Atila Abdulkadiroglu: Columbia University
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2002, vol. 5, issue 3, 681-703
Abstract:
This paper employs a dynamic general equilibrium model to design and evaluate long-term unemployment insurance plans (plans that depend on workers' unemployment history) in economies with and without hidden savings. We show that optimal benefit schemes and welfare implications differ considerably in these two economies. Switching to long-term plans can improve welfare significantly in the absence of hidden savings. However, wefare gains are much lower when we consider hidden savings. Therefore, we argue that switching to long term plans should not be a primary concern from a policy point of view. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: Unemployment insurance; self-insurance; asymmetric and private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)
Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.2002.0159 Full text (application/pdf)
Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and ScienceDirect institutional members. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:v:5:y:2002:i:3:p:681-703
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ription-information/
DOI: 10.1006/redy.2002.0159
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Economic Dynamics is currently edited by Loukas Karabarbounis
More articles in Review of Economic Dynamics from Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().