Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter

Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, 211-223

Abstract: We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Redistribution; Median voter; Capital income taxes; Gorman aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (51)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2006.02.001 Full text (application/pdf)
Access to full texts is restricted to ScienceDirect subscribers and ScienceDirect institutional members. See http://www.sciencedirect.com/ for details.

Related works:
Working Paper: Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter (2006)
Working Paper: Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:issued:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:211-223

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.economic ... ription-information/

DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2006.02.001

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Dynamics is currently edited by Loukas Karabarbounis

More articles in Review of Economic Dynamics from Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().