¿Cuánto vale desertar?

Maria Castillo () and Boris Salazar ()

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2009, vol. 11, issue 20, 199-227

Abstract: Members of an illegal armed organization reveal their desertion minimum values in reaction to the incentives offered by a government. Depending on the organization’s network structure, the desertion of an individual member will unleash a contagion process that will destroy the local network at a varying speed. Staging a game between a government and the members of an illegal organization, connected through a network structure, we show that the speed of the desertion process depends on the network structure and on its members’ minimum desertion values.

Keywords: social networks; desertion; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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