Del desespero de Greenspan a la esperanza de Obama: las bases científicas de la cooperación como principios de regulación

Yochai Benkler ()
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Yochai Benkler: Universidad de Harvard

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2010, vol. 12, issue 23, 29-53

Abstract: A common assumption, often accepted by regulators – that individuals act only in their narrow self-interest – is false. Evidence from both the natural and social sciences suggests that most people are strongly motivated to cooperate and help one another. Organizations (such as Toyota and Wikipedia) that cultivate and take advantage of these inclinations have prospered. Policy can be designed to incorporate attitudes toward cooperation, and to channel these tendencies in productive directions.

Keywords: cooperation; altruism; communication; critique of rational actor model; solidarity; situational framing; norms; trust; transparency; reputation; social dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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