Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama
Xosé Carlos Arias Moreira () and
Gonzalo Caballero Miguez ()
Revista de Economía Institucional, 2003, vol. 5, issue 8, 117-146
Abstract:
Recently a new approach to political economy has been consolidated. The political analysis of transaction costs is an attempt to solve some of the problems which arise in economic theories of public policy. This paper deals with the notions of transaction costs, institutional efficiency, governance structures and commitment value; and defines political interchange as political contracts. Political transactions have high transaction costs and the efficiency of the “political market” requires a democratic system with institutions that favour reasoned decisions and prevents democratic delegation from becoming abdication. This article surveys literature with a transaction cost perspective and shows that it has been very useful for the theoretical explanation of the role of political agents and the evolution of rules that guide their interaction. The main challenge is to provide empirical evidence to the theoretical proposals.
Keywords: economic models; public policies; transaction costs; rules; commitments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D72 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:5:y:2003:i:8:p:117-146
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