Riesgo moral y contratos: cierta evidencia experimental

Julián Arévalo B. () and Jair Ojeda J. ()
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Julián Arévalo B.: Universidad Externado de Colombia
Jair Ojeda J.: Banco de la República
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jair N Ojeda-Joya

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2004, vol. 6, issue 10, 47-69

Abstract: This paper shows one type of asymmetric information problems, their theoretical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Keywords: moral risk; contracts; experimental evidence; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C90 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:6:y:2004:i:10:p:47-69

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