Nash y von Neumann: mundos posibles y juegos de lenguaje

Boris Salazar ()

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2004, vol. 6, issue 10, 71-94

Abstract: Using language game notions and the equivalence between games, this document studies John Nash’s decision of not playing the coalitional game proposed by John von Neumann. The key point is that Nash suggested hypothetical worlds that are incompatible with the kind proposed by von Neumann. And, at the root of this difference, lies their different notions of rationality.

Keywords: modal logic; possible worlds; rationality; language games; cooperative games; non-cooperative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C71 C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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