Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos

Frédéric Boehm

Revista de Economía Institucional, 2005, vol. 7, issue 13, 245-263

Abstract: Regulation plays a key part in public service reforms. However, corruption and the risk of capture may undermine the purposes of these reforms. Both cost and incentive based regulations carry corruption and capture risks. This document shows that capture is a minor problem compared with market failures in different sectors, and thus proposes reforms to generate transparency and accountability in the regulatory processes.

Keywords: corruption; capture; regulation; public services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 L51 L97 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstituci ... gpapers/fboehm13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:7:y:2005:i:13:p:245-263

Access Statistics for this article

Revista de Economía Institucional is currently edited by Alberto Supelano

More articles in Revista de Economía Institucional from Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paola Rodríguez ().