Games of Two Halves: Non-Experimental Evidence on Cooperation, Defection and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Stephen Dobson and John Goddard
Additional contact information
John Goddard: "Bangor Business School, Bangor University"

Review of Economic Analysis, 2018, vol. 10, issue 3, 285-312

Abstract: "We develop a stylized two-period game-theoretic model of the strategic choices made by soccer teams when selecting between defensive and attacking team formations, and between non-violent and violent styles of play. Cooperative behaviour during the early stages of matches is typically superseded by non-cooperation during the latter stages. The propensity for violent play to take place in the latter stages of soccer matches is interpreted as novel non-experimental evidence that players typically resort to mutually detrimental non-cooperative forms of behaviour when the payoffs assume a prisoner’s dilemma structure. "

Keywords: "Game theory; Prisoner’s dilemma; Hazard functions" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://rofea.org/index.php?journal=journal&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=301 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ren:journl:v:10:y:2018:i:3:p:285-312

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Analysis is currently edited by Dr. Jerzy (Jurek) Konieczny

More articles in Review of Economic Analysis from Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dr. Jerzy (Jurek) Konieczny ().