Optimal Product Proliferation in Monopoly: A Dynamic Analysis

Luca Lambertini ()

Review of Economic Analysis, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, 80-97

Abstract: The monopolist's incentives towards product proliferation are evaluated in an optimal control model considering three alternative regimes: profit-seeking; social planning; and a hybrid case with monopoly pricing and a regulator setting product innovation to maximize welfare. In equilibrium, the profit-seeking firm supplies a socially suboptimal number of varieties to reduce cannibalization while the social planner exploits the same effect to satisfy consumersÕ love for variety and decrease the market price of all products. In terms of the Schumpeter vs Arrow debate on the relationship between market structure and innovation incentives, the results obtained in this model have a definite Arrovian flavour.

Keywords: multiproduct firm; product innovation; optimal control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ren:journl:v:1:y:2009:i:1:p:80-97

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