Price Regulation and Health Care with Disease Dynamics

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Review of Economic Analysis, 2015, vol. 7, issue 2, 157-172

Abstract: We build up a differential game to investigate the interplay between the quality of health care and the presence of an evolving disease in a duopoly where patients are heterogeneous along the income dimension. We study the Markov perfect equilibrium, and we identify the admissible parameter region wherein price regulation achieves the twofold objectives of ensuring cares to all patients and heal all of them.

Keywords: health care markets; quality; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H42 I11 I18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ren:journl:v:7:y:2015:i:2:p:157-172

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