EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Non-optimality of For-Profit Firms Acting as Philanthropic Agents

Rosemarie Emanuele and Walter Simmons
Additional contact information
Walter Simmons: John Carroll University, University Heights

Applied Economics and Finance, 2014, vol. 1, issue 1, 27-38

Abstract: We present a model of the nonprofit organization that leads to an allocation in the economy that is Pareto Optimal. This is in contrast to the usual assumption that an economy in which individuals exhibit altruism will not lead to a Pareto Optimal outcome. The presence of nonprofit organizations that function according to this model leads to an outcome in the economy that is Pareto Optimal. The result of Pareto Optimality is based on several assumptions, including the assumption that nonprofit organizations believe that they will not be earning any profit that may be brought forward to the following year. This result suggests an additional reason for the tradition in the United States of absolving nonprofit organizations and donors to such organizations from paying income taxes on such donations. The nonprofit organizations, by acting according to this model, are performing an important economic role in the economy by restoring Pareto Optimality to the economy.

Keywords: nonprofit; philanthropic; altruism; Pareto Optimal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G00 R00 Z0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/aef/article/view/367/306 (application/pdf)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/aef/article/view/367 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rfa:aefjnl:v:1:y:2014:i:1:p:27-38

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Applied Economics and Finance from Redfame publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Redfame publishing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:rfa:aefjnl:v:1:y:2014:i:1:p:27-38