Tullock on the Football Pitch

Stephen Dobson, John Goddard and Frank Stähler

Applied Economics and Finance, 2014, vol. 1, issue 2, 71-77

Abstract: A simple Tullock contest model is used to predict levels of effort in English professional football (soccer). The effort of the teams is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded. Effort levels are found to be higher in matches between evenly talented teams, confirming the idea that asymmetries result in lower effort by participants. The results also suggest that teams¡¯ effort levels are strategic complements.

Keywords: Tullock contest; English football; asymmetries; strategic complements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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