Inefficient Signalling, Education Arms Race and Education Inflation in China

Weiguang Liu

Applied Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 5, issue 6, 61-75

Abstract: Since the higher education expansion and education marketization from 1998, China¡¯s education inflation has become increasingly serious. And correspondingly, the income of graduates remains in a low level. This paper built a model and explained two important reasons. First, the quality of Chinese high education is relatively low, which means the signal effect of education will be less efficient. Second, every individual has an incentive to occupy higher status in the education hierarchy, which means there is a zero-sum education arms race game. I try to build a simple but powerful model in this essay to explain how thses two factors contribute to Chinese education inflation and how they intertwine with each other.

Keywords: signaling efficiency; education arms race; education inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/aef/article/view/3683/3832 (application/pdf)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/aef/article/view/3683 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rfa:aefjnl:v:5:y:2018:i:6:p:61-75

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Applied Economics and Finance from Redfame publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Redfame publishing ().