A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

Yanqing Jiang, Jian Yuan and Mengmeng Zeng

Business and Management Studies, 2016, vol. 2, issue 2, 21-33

Abstract: There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

Keywords: merger & acquisition; game; stakeholder; KKR (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/bms/article/view/1552/1631 (application/pdf)
http://redfame.com/journal/index.php/bms/article/view/1552 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rfa:bmsjnl:v:2:y:2016:i:2:p:21-33

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Business and Management Studies from Redfame publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Redfame publishing ().