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The Competitive Struggle to Win Tournaments: The Allies’ Race to Capture Adolf Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest

Franklin Mixon and Luis R. Gómez-Mejia
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Luis R. Gómez-Mejia: Arizona State University

American Business Review, 2020, vol. 23, issue 1, 3-17

Abstract: Tournament theory posits that there are situations where winning matters a lot and, as a result, agent rewards are not proportional to performance. According to tournament theorists, the large pay differentials that exist between organizational levels are intended to motivate agents to exert greater effort in an attempt to win the prize. Although a large corpus of literature on tournaments has emerged over time, little is known about the social dynamics involved in tournaments. This article addresses this gap through a historical narrative concerning how Allied forces in World War II competed to capture Adolf Hitler’s famed Bavarian reception house, known to the world as the Eagle’s Nest.

Keywords: Tournament theory; Organizational behavior; Competition; Cooperation; Sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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