Endogenous (De)Centralization and the Russian Federalism

Alexander Libman
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Alexander Libman: Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Frankfurt/Main, Germany and Moscow, Russia

Applied Econometrics, 2008, vol. 9, issue 1, 23-57

Abstract: The paper provides the econometric study of the factors of distribution of the tax revenue between the levels of government in the Russian Federation based on the framework of the endogenous centralization theory. The first part of the paper considers the distribution of tax revenue between the federal center and the regions based on strategic tax collection; the second part deals with sub-regional aspects of decentralization. The work applies both the traditional econometrics of panel data and Bayesian econometrics.

Keywords: Federalism; decentralization; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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