A Simple Model of Power and Property Rights in the Inland Fisheries of Bangladesh

Kazi Ali Toufique
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Kazi Ali Toufique: Research Director, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS)

Bangladesh Development Studies, 1997, vol. 25, issue 1-2, 1-29

Abstract: The problem of appropriators to maintain property rights over resource systems is generally considered secondary to the problem of developing institutions that can internalise externalities associated with resource systems. It is assumed that the appropriators maintain property rights over resource systems at zero or negligible costs. In some practical setups this sequence is often reverse — i.e., the appropriators find it increasingly difficult or costly to maintain their rights over resources. We provide such an example from inland fisheries of Bangladesh where the fishers have in general failed to establish property rights over water bodies despite being explicitly sponsored by the state. Property rights over water bodies are transferred to socially powerful agents coming from outside the fishing community. We relate power and enforcement costs to explain this transfer of rights.

Keywords: Bodies of water; Property rights; Fishers; Land management; Fisheries management; Fishery resources; Development studies; Common fisheries policy; Resource ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:badest:0367

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