EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

How Does Competing Against Strategic Investors Alter the Signaling Role of Corporate Venturing Decisions?

Emre Ekinci
Additional contact information
Emre Ekinci: Koc University

Business and Economics Research Journal, 2022, vol. 13, issue 4, 565-577

Abstract: This paper develops a signaling model to examine firms’ corporate venturing decisions when the incumbent firm has private information about the quality of a project proposed by the current employee. Differing from the earlier studies, the analysis focuses on competition among firms, which are inherently strategic investors as the spillovers from the proposed project to their core businesses are crucial to their corporate venturing decisions. The signaling aspect of corporate venturing decisions provides the incumbent firm with an incentive to distort the implementation decision in order to conceal information from rival firms. The analysis shows that the presence of distortion depends primarily upon the opportunity cost of the employee not working in the firm's core business and the informational rents associated with the distortion in project implementation.

Keywords: Corporate Venturing; Signaling; Employee Entrepreneurship; Project Implementation; Strategic Investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L26 M13 M21 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.berjournal.com/how-does-competing-agai ... -venturing-decisions Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:buecrj:0611

Access Statistics for this article

Business and Economics Research Journal is currently edited by Adem Anbar

More articles in Business and Economics Research Journal from Uludag University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adem Anbar ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:ris:buecrj:0611