Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights

Mehmet Karakaya and Seçkin Özbilen
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Seçkin Özbilen: Ozyegin University

Business and Economics Research Journal, 2023, vol. 14, issue 3, 303-319

Abstract: We consider hedonic coalition formation games. A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair which consists of a finite set of agents and a list of agents’ preferences such that each agent has preferences over all coalitions containing her. We study the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights for anonymous and separable hedonic coalition formation games. We prove that for anonymous and separable hedonic games, the existence of a Nash stable partition is always guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Approved Entry or Approved Exit-Free Entry, but the existence of a Nash stable partition is not guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Free Entry. We also analyze the relation of the anonymity and separability with the other sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Hedonic Games; Nash Stability; Membership Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:buecrj:0639

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