Some Issues Relating to Political Electoral Cycles and the Case of Canada

Panos Afxentiou ()
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Panos Afxentiou: University of Calgary, Department of Economics, Postal: 2500 University Drive NW Calgary Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4, http://econ.ucalgary.ca/

Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 1997, vol. 50, issue 1, 1-12

Abstract: Electoral cycles models are designed to integrate economic policy with the re-election objectives of incumbents and the furtherance of interests of their ideological supporters. As systematic studies of complicated issues they have enlightened certain issues, but have not yet generaily been satisfactorily corroborated by experience. An appraisal reveals such theoretical defects as an assumed ability of government to influence through marginal changes the course of the economy, ignoring the variability of lags in policy, and relying on demand-oriented shocks as instruments of targeting macroeconomic variables. Such defects may underlie the failure of Canadian experience to support either the opportunistic or partisan models. Other reasons for this failure of federal government to attain its political objectives are attributed to its loss of leverage in a highly decentralized environment of powerful provincial administrations.

Date: 1997
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