Collusion’s Role in International Oligopo¬listic Equilibria: Suggestions from a Con¬jectural Variations Approach

Coldwell Daniel, III ()
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Coldwell Daniel, III: Fogelman College of Business and Economics, The University of Memphis, Postal: Memphis, Tennessee 38152, USA, http://www.memphis.edu/fcbe/

Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 1995, vol. 48, issue 1, 13-23

Abstract: In order to illustrate the paper’s arguments and to discuss the generation of conjectures that may be found in neoclassical oligopoly theory as they may be applied to international oligopolies, various conjectural variations models of international oligopolies are summarized. It is then argued that, within a particular market, conjectures that are compatible with equilibria require an understanding of a sort that may be generated by the interaction of the market’s supply and demand conditions, the history of the rivals’ behavior, the beliefs and militancy of the antitrust authorities, and, above all, the opportunities for reciprocity and mutual profitability resulting from adopting such conjectures.

Date: 1995
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