On International Differences in Dividend Policies

Luca Beltrametti

Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 1993, vol. 46, issue 2-3, 168-179

Abstract: We present a model in which two types of shareholders play a (repeated) game aimed at determining the use of a given amount of profits. For realistic and wide ranges of parameter values, the payment of dividends may he a stable, rational and Pareto optimal solution for the repeated game even if each agent likes capital gains better than dividends. We suggest that the payment of dividends could be a social institution arising from a repeated prisoners’ dilemma situation. We contend that our approach might provide same hint accounting for the international differences in dividend policies.

Date: 1993
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