Unstable Transfer Policy, Threat Perception and the Legal Foundations

Richard E. Gift ()
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Richard E. Gift: Depatment of Economics, University of Kentucky, Postal: Lexington, Kentucky 40506, USA, http://www.uky.edu/

Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 1992, vol. 45, issue 3-4, 318-329

Abstract: J. M. Keynes’ provocative The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1920) was never followed up with a formal model that would make it possible to generalize unstable transfer policy. Throughout the following seven decades the problem has often been discussed, but an abstract analytical system has never been developed. Common in this literature is the implication that peace itself is ultimately at issue in the search for macroecnomic stability. The present paper attempts to state an explicit formal model that will support theoretical generalization of this kind. From this is derived a statement of the conditions under which coordination can stabilize a transfer policy.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:ecoint:0452

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