Coordinamento internazionale delle poli¬tiche economiche. Indispensabile o superfluo?

Paolo Conci and Giulio Ferrarese
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Paolo Conci: Università di Trento
Giulio Ferrarese: Università di Verona

Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 1984, vol. 37, issue 3-4, 255-267

Abstract: In this article the authors attempt to evaluate critically some theories dealing with the problem of international coordination of economic policies. Moreover, they have taken into account recent contributions which have undermined the solutions given by the theory of games. The article consists of two parts: in the first part the authors examine the applications of game theory to this specific problem, in the second part they consider the divergence of results between the theoretical approach and an econometric one followed by two researchers from the University of Harvard.

Date: 1984
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