Regionalism and Incentives for Multilateralism
Journal of Economic Integration, 2000, vol. 15, 1-18
The paper studies the effects of regional integration on the incentives of mem - bers and non-members to undertake multilateral trade liberalization. Using a three- country political economy model with imperfect competion, it shows how regionalism can undermine support for multilateralism. Discriminatory trade policies alter the balance of gains and losses that members and non-members experience from multilateral liberalization. As the degree of preference within the PTA increases, the member countries’ support for large multilateral tariff cuts, as well as the excluded countries’ support for small multilateral trade liber - alization, declines.
Keywords: Regionalism; Multilateralism; Trade Liberalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F12 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:integr:0122
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