Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry

Stefan Lutz

Journal of Economic Integration, 2000, vol. 15, 314-344

Abstract:

In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face qualitydependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With signifi - cantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares.

Keywords: product differentiation; oligopoly; trade; quality standards; entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Working Paper: Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:integr:0135

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