A Further Analysis on the Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration

Makoto Tawada () and Eriko Hiraiwa
Additional contact information
Makoto Tawada: Nagoya University, Postal: School of Economics Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan
Eriko Hiraiwa: Nagoya University, Postal: School of Economics Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan

Journal of Economic Integration, 2003, vol. 18, 420-432

Abstract:

This paper re-examines Yoshida’s analysis (1993 and 1996) and draws further aspects of economic welfare within Bond and Chen's framework (1987). We show that an increase in fine that a firm pays could be a better policy than an intensification of internal inspection enforcement from a welfare point of view. We also show that, in the case where capital is internationally mobile, if technologies are different between countries and labor-capital intensity is larger in the home country than in the foreign, the impact of an increase in enforcement on the factor prices is opposite to that of Bond and Chen (1987). We also enlarge the welfare effect of an increase in enforcement more precisely in the case of capital movement.

Keywords: Illegal immigration; National welfare; Capital mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:integr:0242

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Integration is currently edited by Seongeun Kim

More articles in Journal of Economic Integration from Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yunhoe Kim ().