Two Alternative Sequences of WTO Negotiations: Implications for Welfare

Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis ()
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Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis: United Nations University - World Institute, Postal: UNU-WIDER, Katajanokanlaituri 6B; Helsinki;, 00200 Finland

Journal of Economic Integration, 2004, vol. 19, 271-288

Abstract:

We develop a partial equilibrium, sequential model of trade negotiation between an OECD country and two developing countries. First, we show that there are substantive qualitative and quantitative differences in the state of market access and domestic support that emerge under possible alternative sequences in which the negotiating game can be played. We then explore the welfare implications of such alternative sequences on the various stakeholders within the OECD. The welfare outcomes point to various lobbying activities which can influence the trade negotiator and contribute to the confusion and disagreement on who should commit to its policies first.

Keywords: WTO; Sequential; Welfare; Lobbying; Tariffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:integr:0275

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