Who Gains From Tariff Escalation?

Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis ()
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Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis: United Nations University-World Institute, Postal: UNU-WIDER; Katajanokanlaituri 6 B; Helsinki 00200, Finland

Journal of Economic Integration, 2004, vol. 19, 416-425

Abstract:

With the help of a simple model of production and trade, we examine the differential impact of tariff escalation on skilled and unskilled wages in an economy. Our findings provide a lobbying-based explanation of the prevalence of tariff escalation in developed countries. It also predicts the possible response of the developing country and shows how similar lobbying activity in that country can slow the pace of liberalization of service sector trade.

Keywords: Escalation; Tariff; Lobby; Developing country; WTO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F11 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:integr:0282

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