Cash and Share Renting: An Empirical Test of the Link Between Entrepreneurial Ability and Contractual Choice

D.J. Brown and J.H. Atkinson

Bell Journal of Economics, 1981, vol. 12, issue 1, 296-299

Abstract: Why do rent, wage, and sharecropping contracts exist simultaneously? One possibility is that contract types distinguish between workers with different endowments of managerial ability. This article describes an empirical test of the link between managerial ability and contract choice.

Date: 1981
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