Competition, Profit Incentives, and Technical Efficiency in the Provision of Nuclear Medicine Services

George W. Wilson and Joseph M Jadlow ()

Bell Journal of Economics, 1982, vol. 13, issue 2, 472-482

Abstract: This study tests several hypotheses about the relative efficiency of proprietary and nonprofit hospitals in the provision of nuclear medicine services. It also examines the effects that service rivalry among hospitals has on technical efficiency. Linear programming techniques and regression analysis are applied to data from over 900 proprietary, private nonprofit and government hospitals. The results indicate that proprietary hospitals are more efficient than all other types of hospitals and that government hospitals are less efficient than all other types. In addition, the findings support the hypothesis that hospitals in geographic markets with structures conducive to service rivalry tend to be less efficient than hospitals in markets that are less conducive to such rivalry.

Date: 1982
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